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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
this tendency by its lack of emphasis on the precise steps necessary
to bring a redhibition action. 2 Louisiana courts will have to reiter-
ate some of these formal requirements in order to keep the redhi-
bition statutes sharply defined.
Whether broadly or narrowly interpreted, however, Philippe v.
Browning Arms Co. is a milestone in both tort and redhibition law
in Louisiana. Philippe synthesizes the two procedurally, and adds
substantive weight to the increasingly important area of products
liability.
Lois E. Hawkins
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON PATRONAGE PRACTICE:
Branti v. Finkel
Defendant, the newly-appointed Democratic Public Defender of
Rockland County, New York, attempted to dismiss the plaintiffs, two
Republican' assistant public defenders. In an attempt to retain their
jobs plaintiffs sought an injunction,' alleging that the sole reason for
the attempted discharges was their political affiliation.? On appeal,
the United States Supreme Court held that the discharge of an
72. Philippe v. Browning Arms Co., 395 So. 2d at 318 n.13 (La. 1981). Compare
this language with the precise scheme discussed at notes 43-45, supra.
1. Plaintiff Finkel switched his party registration from Republican to Democrat
in 1977 in an apparent attempt to improve his chances of being retained when a new
Democratic public defender was appointed. This move failed; the Supreme Court found
that the parties still regarded Finkel as a Republican.
2. Suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976).
3. As Republicans, the plaintiffs were unable to obtain the recommendation or
sponsorship of a Democratic legislator or chairperson, and the defendant Branti sought
to replace them with persons who had such sponsorship. Branti also attempted to
argue that he would have fired the plaintiffs anyway because they were incompetent,
but the Court found the district court's finding that the plaintiffs were satisfactorily
performing their jobs was supported adequately by the record. 445 U.S. 507, 512, at
n.6. Under Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), a plaintiff
seeking to prove dismissal for the exercise of his first amendment rights must show
that he would not have been dismissed "but for" the protected conduct. For lower
court discussions of the Mount Healthy City burden of proof in a patronage dismissal
case see Rosaly v. Ignacio, 593 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1979); Miller v. Board of Educ. of Lin-
coln, 450 F. Supp. 106 (S.D. W. Va. 1978); Tanner v. McCall, 441 F. Supp. 503 (M.D.
Fla. 1977). aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 625 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1980); Lasco v. Koch, 428
F. Supp. 468 (S.D. I1. 1977).
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assistant public defender solely because of his political affiliation
would violate his first and fourteenth amendment rights to freedom
of political association under the United States Constitution.' Branti
v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
Lower courts' early had sustained the practice of patronage
dismissal' by accepting two arguments: the "waiver" theory and the
"right-privilege" distinction. The waiver theory states that employ-
ees who obtain their jobs through patronage "waive" their right to
challenge a dismissal by the same system.' The right-privilege dis-
tinction declares that public employment is a privilege, which
government may condition.'
The United States Supreme Court first held patronage dismis-
sals unconstitutional in Elrod v. Burns.' The Court reasoned that
since the system often required the employee to become closely in-
4. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or eathe press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. Some first amendment protections are
applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1931).
5. The Seventh Circuit was the only circuit court to find the practice unconstitu-
tional. See Burns v. Elrod, 509 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1975) affd, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Il-
linois State Employees v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 928
(1973); Shakman v. Democratic Organization, 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 909 (1971).
6. Patronage dismissals are part of the general practice of political patronage,
which is the system of rewarding political supporters with government jobs, contracts
and other government benefits. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 353 (1976).
7. See, e.g., Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied 420
U.S. 1005 (1975); American Federation of State Employees v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 280
A.2d 375 (1971).
8. See, e.g., Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1020 (1972); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affd per curiam by an
equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
9. 427 U.S. 347 (1976). Elrod involved Republican non-civil service employees of
the Cook County, Illinois sheriffs office who were discharged by the newly-elected
Democratic sheriff because they did not affiliate with the Democratic party and did not
obtain its support. There was no majority opinion in Elrod. The Court split into a
three-justice plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White
and Marshall, a concurrence by Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Blackmun, a dissent
by Chief Justice Burger and a dissent by Justice Powell joined by Justice Rehnquist
and the Chief Justice; Justice Stevens did not participate. While the plurality limited
its decision to patronage dismissals, id. at 353, it indicated a disapproval of "the prac-
tice of patronage," perhaps implying disapproval of the other forms of patronage. Id.
at 355. The concurrence refused to comment on "the broad contours of the so-called
patronage system .. " Id. at 374 (Blackmun & Stewart, JJ., concurring).
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volved" with the political party in power, patronage dismissal in-
fringed upon the employee's freedom of political association and be-
lief" safeguarded by the first amendment. The Elrod Court sum-
marily rejected the "waiver" argument" accepted by the lower
courts. Relying primarily on Perry v. Sindermann" and Keyishian v.
Board of Regents," the plurality also rejected the "right-privilege"
distinction: while the recipient has no "right" to a government
benefit, the government may not condition the receipt of such bene-
fit on the employee's support for the party in power-a condition
the Elrod Court described as unconstitutional."
In Elrod, the Court recognized that the "strict scrutiny" test
should be applied to patronage dismissal cases since the interest at
issue, political association, was fundamental." Under this analysis,
the Court would sustain the infringement on the employee's first
amendment rights only if the governmental interests advanced were
compelling and if the means used by the government were the least
restrictive to achieve the desired end." While the government ad-
vanced several interests to support the dismissal, the Elrod Court
10. Among such requirements were (1) affiliation with the party in power, (2) con-
tribution of a part of wages to the party, (3) working for party candidates, and (4) ob-
taining the sponsorship of a party member. Id at 355-57. These requirements reduced
the amount of help, financial and otherwise, the employee could give to support his
own beliefs. Id. at 355-56.
11. The right to associate with the political party of one's choice to advance
beliefs and ideas is recognized as a right protected under the first and fourth amend-
ments. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.. 431 U.S. 209, 233 (1977); Kusper v.
Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963); Bates v.
Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
12. 427 U.S. at 359-60 n.13. See generally Breast. The Supreme Court 1975
Term-Patronage Firings, 90 HARV. L. REV. 186, 187 (1976); Note, Elrod v. Burns:
Constitutional Job Security for Public Employees?, 37 LA. L. REv. 990, 992 n.8 (1977).
13. 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Perry involved the dismissal of a non-tenured state college
professor because of his public criticism of the school's policies. According to the Perry
Court the plaintiff need not have a contractual right to his job for his first amendment
rights to be protected. Id at 597-98.
14. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). Keyijhian also involved a non-tenured teacher: the Court
implicitly based its decision on the premise that non-renewal of the teacher's contract
could not be predicated on the exercise of first and fourteenth amendment rights.
15. 427 U.S. at 360, 361 & n.13.
16. Id at 362.
17. Id. at 362-63. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414
U.S. 51, 58 (1973); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31-33 (1968); United States v. Robe],
389 U.S. 258. 265 (1967); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); NAACP v. But-
ton, 371 U.S. 415, 464-66 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 3864 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960); United
Public Workers v, Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96 (1947).
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rejected each one." However, the Court expressly recognized "[t]he
need for political loyalty of employees, not to the end that effec-
tiveness and efficiency be insured, but to the end that represen-
tative government not be undercut by tactics obstructing the im-
plementation of policies of the new administration, policies presuma-
bly sanctioned by the electorate.""
The Elrod Court declared that this interest is not so compelling
as to justify all patronage dismissals. The plurality observed that
the interest may be served in a less restricted manner by limiting
the employees who could be discharged because of their political af-
filiation to "policy-making"' and "confidential" employees."
In an attempt to guide lower courts in categorizing employees
the Elrod Court stated:
The nature of the responsibilities is critical. . . .An employee
18. The government first advanced its interest in insuring "effective government
and the efficiency of public employees." 427 U.S. at 364. The Court countered that
political association was not a proper basis for imputing ill will, id at 365, and noted
the inefficiency resulting from "wholesale replacement" of employees after a political
changeover. Id. at 364. The Court also stated that a less restrictive means, discharge
for cause (such as for insubordination or for poor job performance) was available to
meet this end. The government also urged its interest in preserving the democratic
process by preserving the two-party system. The dissent accepted the importance of
this interest, stating that patronage furthers the stability of political parties (which are
necessary elements in the democratic process) by providing rewards for participating
in party activity. /d at 368-79. The plurality rejected the contention that patronage
was necessary for the survival of the two-party system. Id. at 369.
19. Id. at 367.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 374 (Blackmun & Stewart, JJ.. concurring). See note 9, supra. The con-
curring opinion generally has been regarded by lower courts as narrower than the
plurality opinion, and is viewed as the holding of the Court. See, e.g., Stegmaier v.
Trammel, 597 F.2d 1027, 1033-34 (5th Cir. 1979); Alfaro de Quevado v. DeJesus Schuck,
556 F.2d 591. 592 n.2 (1st Cir. 1977); Tanner v. McCall, 441 F. Supp. 503, 511-12 (M.D.
Fla. 1977); Ramey v. Harber, 431 F. Supp. 657, 662 (W.D. Va. 1977), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 589 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1978). See generally Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 193 (1977).
Several lower courts have tried to resolve the question whether "confidential" is a
separate criteria which alone would justify permitting a patronage dismissal, or
whether it is ancillary to the policymaking criteria. In other words, is a "confidential"
employee one in a confidential relationship to the policymaking process? Compare Mc-
Collum v. Stahl, 579 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 912 (1979);
Stegmaier v. Trammel, 597 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1979) and Catterson v. Caso, 472 F.
Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) with Rosenthal v. Rizzo, 555 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 892 (1977); Loughney v. Hickey, 480 F. Supp. 1352 (M.D. Pa. 1979),
remanded, 625 F.2d 1063 (3d Cir. 1980) and Finkel v. Branti, 457 F. Supp. 1284
(S.D.N.Y. 1978). affd, 598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979).
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with responsibilities not well-defined or of broad scope more
likely functions in a policymaking position .... [C]onsideration
should also be given to whether the employee acts as an advisor
or formulates plans for the implementation of broad goals.'
This distinction has been criticized as vague and difficult to
follow," but the lower courts have used it to determine whether cer-
tain positions were protected." Several lower panels construed the
decision narrowly and as limited to its facts. On the other hand,
other courts gave Elrod a broad reading, extending the rationales to
the failure to rehire," demotions," and undesirable transfers."
In the instant case, Branti v. Finkel," the defendant, a Demo-
crat, was appointed public defender by a predominantly democratic
legislature." After the plaintiffs' terms as assistant public defenders
expired the defendant failed to reappoint them because they were
22. 427 U.S. at 467-68.
23. "Such a distinction proves simple at either end of the employment spectrum,
but would be almost impossible to accomplish where the groups shade together." Com-
ment, Patronage Dismissal and Compelling State Interests, Can the Policymak-
ing/Nonpolicymaking Distinction Withstand Strict Scrutiny?, 1978 S. ILL. U.L.J. 278,
287 (1978) (quoting Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349, 1354 (4th Cir. 1974)). See Com-
ment, Political Patronage and the Fourth Circuit's Test of Dichargeability after
Elrod v. Burna, 16 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 655, 668 (1979).
24. For positions considered policymaking, see, e.g., Newcomb v. Brennan, 558
F.2d 825 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 968 (1977) (a deputy city attorney is a policy-
maker because he has "broad powers and duties described in both the City Charter
and the Milwaukee Code of Ordinances.") (Id. at 827 (footnotes omitted)); Alfaro de
Quevado v. DeJesus Schuck, 556 F.2d 591, 593 (1st Cir. 1977) (the director of an Office
of Criminal Justice was a policymaker because she had "broad discretion to carry out
hazily defined purposes and to render advice.") (/d. at 593); Rivera Morales v. Benitez
de Rexach, 541 F.2d 882, 885 (Ist Cir. 1976) (an assistant secretary of education was a
polcymaker because the "position was one of trust, involving minor policymaking func-
tions.") Ltd. at 885): Catterson v. Caso, 472 F. Supp. 883, 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1.979) (a county
district attorney was_ a policymaker because he "has considerable discretion in
operating his office.") (Id at 837): Rosenberg v. Redevelopment Auth. of Philadelphia,
428 F. Supp. 498, 501 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (the director of a Real Estate Department was a
policymaker because he was "directly involved in the formulation of policies of the
RDA ....") (Id. at 501). For positions considered nonpolicymaking. see, e.g.. Savage v.
Pennsylvania, 475 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (a liquor control board examiner); Vin-
cent v. Maeras, 447 F. Supp. 775 (S.D. 1l. 1978) (a communications technician); Dyke v.
Otlowski, 154 N.J. Super. 377, 381 A.2d 413 (1977) (senior housing inspectors).
25. See Ramey v. Harber, 589 F.2d 753, 760-61 (4th Cir. 1978) (Hall, J.,
concurring); Mulberin v. O'Brien, 588 F.2d 853, 857, (1st Cir. 1978).
26. See note 88, intfra.
27. Morris v. City of Kokomo. 881 N.E.2d 510, 516 (1978).
28. Johnson v. Bergland, 586 F.2d 993, 995 (4th Cir. 1978).
29. 446 U.S. 507 (1980).
s0. 445 U.S. at 509.
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not sponsored by the Democratic party.81 Plaintiffs obtained an in-
junction, blocking the public defender's actions." On appeal the
Supreme Court rejected each point the defendant raised to distin-
guish the instant case from Elrod." The Branti Court shifted the
focus of examination from whether an employee is a policymaker to
"whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation
is an appropriate requirement of the public office involved."" The
Court stated that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for
employment only when "an employee's private political beliefs
would interfere with the discharge of his public duties. ... "5
Examination of Branti indicates that the Elrod decision was not
an anomaly limited to its unique facts." In Branti a clear majority"7
31. Id. at 508.
32. Finkel v. Branti, 457 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The district court found
that the plaintiffs did not make policy affecting the overall operation of the Public
Defender's office but did so in the context of specific cases, and did not come within
the type of broad policymaking discussed in Elrod. Id. at 1291. The court also held that
the plaintiffs were not confidential employees, because any confidential aspect of their
position was with respect to their client's cases and not the policymaking process. Id.
The district court saw the concept of "confidentiality" as ancillary to the policymaking
concept. Id. See note 21, supra.
33. The defendant Branti argued that a "failure to reappoint" was distinguishable
from a dismissal. 446 U.S. at 512 n.6. He next asserted that the plaintiffs had
knowledge that their jobs were patronage jobs and should not have expected to be
reappointed by a member of the opposing party. The Court stated that such a "waiver
argument" had been rejected in Elrod. IS Furthermore, the defendant argued that the
holding in Elrod only prohibited "dismissals resulting from an employee's failure to
capitulate to political coercion" and that a requirement of a sponsor in the dominant
party was not coercion. Id. at 516. Some lower courts have indicated agreement with
this proposed limitation on Elrod, declaring that as long as employees are not asked to
change their political affiliation they have not been coerced. See Roenthal v. Rizzo, 555
F.2d 390, 394 n.1 (3d Cir. 1977) (Aldisert, J., dissenting); Committee for Protection of
First Amendment Rights v. Bergland, 434 F. Supp. 314 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Bergland
.no facts ... (showed] that the Secretary attempted in any way to require these per-
sons to associate with his own party, or interfered in any way with their exercise of
First Amendment rights, as was the case in Elrod." 434 F. Supp. at 320.
The Court answered that a plaintiff in a patronage dismissal case need not prove
that he has been coerced in his political associations, but must show only that the sole
reason for his dismissal was his political affiliation or lack thereof. 445 U.S. at 517. In-
terestingly. in Branti, the plaintiff Finkel had apparently felt enough pressure to
change his affiliation in hopes of being retained. 445 U.S. at 516 n.11.
34. 445 U.S. at 518. An example of a position in which political affiliation is an ap-
propriate requirement, i e., where the employee's private political beliefs may interfere
with effective performance of his public duty, is a governor's assistant who "writels
speeches, explainis] his views to the press, or communicate[s] with the legislature." IX
36. Id. at 518.
36. See Mulherin v. O'Brien, 588 F.2d 853, 857 (1st Cir. 1978); Gowan v. Tally, 45
N.Y.2d 83, 379 N.E.2d 177 (1978).
37. While Elrod was only a plurality opinion, see note 9, supra, Branti is a majori-
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
not only reaffirmed disapproval of patronage dismissals, but also in-
dicated a disapproval of other patronage practices. The Court re-
solved a conflict in several lower courts by extending the principles
of Elrod to the "failure to rehire" situation."
Language in Branti suggests that the protection of political
association might even extend to patronage hiring. Although the
opinion was limited specifically to failure to reappoint,89 the majority
found difficulty in perceiving "any justification for tying either the
selection or retention of an assistant public defender to his party af-
filiation.""0 While suggestive of a disapproval of patronage hirings,
the excerpt is no certain indication of the result should the Court ac-
tually confront such a situation." A failure to rehire, closely
analagous to a dismissal, has been called a difference of "form and
not of substance."'" On the other hand, a failure to hire arguably dif-
fers significantly from a dismissal, since a failure to hire could have
less impact on a job applicant's beliefs than the threat of discharge
would have on an employee. Some commentators have noted, how-
ever, that a job applicant's freedom of association might be greatly
ty decision. The opinion was written by Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice
Burger, and also by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun. Chief Justice
Burger shifted from dissent in Elrod in which he had dissented on the grounds that
the Court was intruding on state legislative concerns. See 427 U.S. 347, 375 (1976)
(Burger, C.J., concurring). Justice Stewart, who concurred in Elrod, dissented in Bran-
ti, stating that assistant public defenders were confidential employees. 445 U.S. at
520-21 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justices Powell and Rehnquist also dissented basically
for the same reasons as they had in Elrod: because the contribution that patronage
makes to strengthen political parties, and the contribution strong political parties in
turn make to the democratic process and to accountability of government, outweighs
the infringement on first amendment rights. 445 U.S. at 507, 522, 527-32 (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
38. 445 U.S. at 512 n.6. For lower courts discussions of the "failure to rehire" no-
tion, see Francia v. White, 594 F.2d 778 (10th Cir. 1979); Reed v. Hamblen Cty. of
Tenn., 468 F. Supp. 2d (E.D. Tenn. 1979); Ramey v. Harber, 431 F. Supp. 657 (W.D.
Va.), affd in part, rev'd in part, 589 F.2d 754 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 910
(1979).
39. 445 U.S. at 513 n.7.
40. Id at 520 n.14 (emphasis added). The dissent stated that the majority
"perceived no Constitutional distinction between selection and dismissal of public
employees." Id at 522 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
41. For a discussion of the possible split of the Court on patronage hirings see
Brest, aupra note 12. at 186, 194-95 (1976). For a discussion of the extension of Elrod to
other forms of patronage see Note, Patronage and the First Amendment After Elrod
v. Burns, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 468, 473-78 (1978).
42. Hargrave, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978.1979
Term-Louisiana Constitutional Law. 40 LA. L. REV. 717. 721 (1980).
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affected by a failure to hire because of the applicant's political af-
filiation. 3 Nonetheless, the Branti Court left the issue open."
Extension of the prohibition to hirings would raise problems of
proof. In the case of political hiring the employer might more easily
justify non-hiring on grounds other than the plaintiff's political af-
filiation-such as the other applicants being "better qualified."' 5
In addition to problems of proof as to cause, the plaintiff in a
non-hiring case may have standing problems. A plaintiff challenging
a refusal to hire may have difficulty showing "a direct, personal in-
jury resulting from a constitutional violation that court action could
cure," because he may be simply "one of many not hired,"" or may
not be able to show that he would have been the recipient of the job
if the constitutional violation had not occurred." Therefore, even if
the Court were to extend Elrod and Branti to prohibit patronage
hirings, problems of proof and standing would be obstacles to. any
real practical protection for persons refused employment because of
their political affiliation.
In Branti, the majority delineated a new standard for determin-
ing when the political affiliation of a public employee legitimately
may be considered as a condition to his employment. Perhaps to pro-
mote a more analytical approach by the lower courts, the Court re-
defined the test to ask whether "party affiliation is an appropriate
requirement for the effective performance of the public office in-
volved."" While the new test redirects attention away from labeling
a person a policymaker or confidential employee, the two concepts
are not discarded2 Whether a person is a policymaking or confiden-
43. One commentator has noted that the class affected by patronage hirings is
larger, and where the job market is tight applicants may be "coerced" into changing
their affiliation in order to obtain a job. Brest, supra note 12 at 195.
44. 445 U.S. at 513 n.7.
46. Note, supra note 41, at 480. Under Mount Healthy City Board of Education v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). the burden is on the plaintiff to show that he would not
have been dismissed "but for" the protected conduct. See note 3, supra.
46. Note, aupra note 41, at 480. This test for standing is stated In Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
47. Note, supra note 41, at 480. Under Wurth the Court will not exercise jurisdic-
tion if the injury is so generalized as to be "shared in substantially equal measure by a
large class of citizens ... " 422 U.S. at 499.
48. A plaintiff must be able to show that absent the constitutional violation he
could have received the benefit. Note, supra note 41, at 481 (citing Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490. 499 (1975)).
49. 445 U.S. at 518.
50. The dissent took the opposite view, stating that to consider the breadth of
19811
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tial employee still appears to be significant in determining whether
his political affiliation is an appropriate factor to be considered. In
Branti, the policymaking and confidential employee indicators were
used to determine that political affiliation was not an appropriate re-
quirement for an assistant public defender. The Court's conclusion
that the assistant public defender's political affiliation will have no
effect on his job performance was based upon the fact that an assis-
tant public defender does not make policy related to partisan
political interests but only makes policy decisions regarding his
client's cases."' Also, the Court reasoned that any access an assistant
public defender has to confidential information is based on attorney-
client relations and has no connection with partisan political in-
terests."2
The Court contrasted the assistant public defender's respon-
sibilities with those of a deputy prosecutor who has "broad respon-
sibilities""3 (an indicia of a policymaker in Elrod). Thus, while the
concepts of the policymaking and confidential employee are no
longer determinative, they apparently continue to be very useful
tools for determining when private political beliefs will be deemed
to impair job performance. Also, the Court appears to be rewording
the test in order to clarify the type of policymaking referred to in
Elrod-policymaking related to "partisan political interests. " '" The
new test may be an attempt at a more functional approach to the
problem. It requires not only a determination of policymaker/non-
policymaker, but also an additional inquiry into whether an employee's
party affiliation would interfere with the performance of his job.
This determination requires a more searching inquiry into the em-
ployee's actual duties and into how the performance of those duties
may be realistically related to his political beliefs. Examples of
employees who fall within the Branti exception55 are persons with a
close relationship to a government official in a political sense, in that
they are involved in helping the official express his political views.
responsibilities is "inconsistent with the Court's assertion that the 'ultimate inquiry is
not whether the label 'policymaker' . . . fits a particular position'...." Id. at 518 n.5
(Powell, J., dissenting). However, the dissent overlooked the fact that the operative
word here is "ultimate." Id. at 518. The Court did not mean that inquiry into whether
an employee is a policymaker is no longer relevant, but only that the inquiry is not
determinative.
51. Id. at 519.
52. Id.
53. Id at 519 n.13.
54. See text at note 52. supra.
55. See note 34, supra.
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Similarly, the Court's discussion of the relevancy of the policymak-
ing/confidential criteria to the question of whether an assistant
public defender could be discharged on the basis of political affilia-
tion implies that persons to whom an elected official delegates broad
policymaking functions may be chosen on the basis of their political
affiliation.'
In sum, the test in Branti appears to be more of a redefinition of
the Elrod test than a completely new test. Arguably, the redefined
test broadens the class of protected employees in that the class of
persons whose jobs are realistically related to partisan interests is
smaller than the class of all policymakers.
One may question whether the Court succeeded in setting forth
a less vague and uncertain test or merely exchanged one uncertain
test for another. Determining whether an employee's political affilia-
tion would impair the performance of his public duties may be no
easier than determining whether he is a policymaker. The dissent in
Branti characterizes the new standard as "vague" and "certain to
create vast uncertainty."57 The difficulty government officials may
have in determining with certainty whether a dismissal is justified
is a problem under the new test as a consequence of this vagueness."
The answer to this criticism, however, is that no other workable
alternative exists. While some type of "bright-line test" may be
desirable from the standpoint of the government, the nature of the
problem does not lend itself to such a test. Considering the many
thousands of public employees with infinite varieties and combina-
tions of duties, public employment clearly does not lend itself to a
"bright-line rule." The balancing of an individual's rights with the
government's interest is best accomplished on a case-by-case basis.
A "bright-line test" would necessarily be either overinclusive or
underinclusive. While the test in Branti may not be as certain as
could be desired, it is likely to promote a more careful case-by-case
analysis by both the courts and by officials considering the dis-
charge or non-rehiring of an employee.
Perhaps one of the most puzzling aspects of Branti is its indica-
56. The official may assume the employees will be more able to develop policies in
line with his own views. Also included in this type of position are individuals who act
as advisors to the government official, because the official could expect advice more in
line with his views to come from persons with similar political beliefs. Whether an
employee acted as an advisor was a question to be asked to determine if he was a
policymaker in Elrod. 427 U.S. at 368 (1976).
57. 445 U.S. at 524 (Powell, J., dissenting).
58. Id
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tion that the decision in Elrod was based on the government's in-
terest in effectiveness and efficiency and that the discharge of the
employees involved in Elrod did not further the governmental in-
terest." This reasoning was not the basis of the Elrod decision.
Moreover, the Court in Elrod specifically rejected dismissals on the
basis of an employee's political affiliation as a means of furthering
governmental effectiveness and 'efficiency and stated that discharge
for cause was the means to this end." The only interest approved by
the Court in Elrod was the government's interest that represen-
tative government not be undercut by obstructive tactics."1
If the Court is changing the underlying rationale for permitting
consideration of an employee's political affiliation, the change could
be a significant development. The underlying rationale must be re-
membered when determining whether an employee may be dis-
charged for his political affiliation. If the underlying reason for
allowing some patronage dismissals is to ensure governmental effec-
tiveness and efficiency, then the result may be different from allow-
ing dismissals to ensure that representative government not be
undercut. While the Branti court apparently rejected the govern-
mental argument that an employer may not be able to work effi-
ciently with an employee merely because he is of a different political
affiliation,"2 the governmental efficiency rationale could possibly be
significant in the case of active political conduct -more particularly,
active political conduct against an elected official with whom the
employee must work with closely." Of course, an employer faced
with an employee who has actively campaigned against him argu-
ably should be able to continue his professional relationship with the
employee, and as long as the employee performs his job in a compe-
tent manner and obeys the employer's directives he must be retained.
If the employee is not competent or is unable to take instructions,
59. 445 U.S. at 517.
60. 427 U.S. at 366. See text at note 18, supra.
61. 427 U.S. at 367. See text at note 19, aupra.
62. 427 U.S. at 364-65.
63. A lower Court opinion, Ramey v. Harber, 589 F.2d 753 (4th Cir. 1978), dealing
with the discharge of deputy sheriffs by a newly-elected sheriff, distinguished Elrod
because the employees in Elrod were discharged for a general failure to support the
Democratic party. id at 757. whereas the plaintiffs involved in Ramey had actually
campaigned against the defendant sheriff. Id at 756. The Court stated that the effi-
cient operation of the sheriffs office depended on mutual cooperation and confidence
between the deputies and the sheriff. Id For a case reaching the opposite conclusion
see Francia v. White, 594 F.2d 778, 780 (10th Cir. 1979). Viewed realistically, active
political activity by an employee against an employer with whom he must work closely
could impair the relationship in such a way as to make It difficult for the two to work
efficiently together.
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he may be discharged for cause." Viewed realistically, however, a
close professional relationship may be impaired by a hard-fought
political campaign, with the employee and employer on opposite
sides, in which the employer's job depends on his re-election. Where-
as, the relationship probably would not be impaired if the two are
simply of different political affiliations.
While Branti did not deal with active conduct by an employee
against his employer, the basis of Justice Stewart's dissent seems to
be that the close professional relationship between the public
defender and his assistants "with the necessity of mutual confidence
and trust"' could be impaired by mere difference of party affiliation.
While one may not agree with Justice Stewart regarding mere af-
filiation, active conduct by the assistant public defenders against the
public defender could make his position very tenable."
The Court's decision in Branti does not answer many of the
questions raised by its decision in Elrod. To what other forms of
patronage the Court will extend its prohibition is still uncertain.
The new standard for determining whether an employee's political
affiliation may be considered as a condition of his employment does
not appear to be easier to apply or to lend itself to more certainty."
The Court may have restated the test, however, in such a way that
will foster a more careful and analytical approach by lower courts:
an approach which will give correct results on a case-by-case basis
after a careful balancing of the individual's first amendment rights
and the governmental interests involved.
Brenda Hareleon Verbois
64. See note 18, supra.
65. 445 U.S. at 520-21 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
66. Of course, this argument is only persuasive when the active political conduct
was against an employer with whom the employee must work closely, as opposed to
conduct only amounting to the employee's active support of just anyone not of the
"correct" party.
One reason given by the Democratic Committee Chairperson that she could not
help one of the plaintiffs in Branti to retain his job was that he had been active in the
campaign of a Republican candidate for county judge. The support of a person in this
position is not the type of close employee-employer relationship referred to in the text
and should not have been a basis of the plaintiffs discharge under that argument.
67. Officials in government, when making decisions on employees they may
discharge due to political affiliation, should carefully study the employee's duties to
see if they have a real connection to partisan political concerns. If there is any doubt
about the dischargeability of the employee he should be retained, because the burden
is on the government to justify his dismissal on partisan grounds. 427 U.S. at 362-03.
However, this should not be too great a burden on the government because it is
presumed that the employee is competent and obeys the directives of his employer or
he could be discharged for cause.
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